We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for experience goods where sellers can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed (somewhere between the endogenous oligopoly and monopoly prices). While oligopolies benefit consumers regardless of whether prices are fixed or endogenously chosen, we find that price competition lowers efficiency as consumers pay too little attention to reputation for quality. This provides empirical support to recent models in behavioral IO that assume that consumers may with increasing complexity of the market place focus on selected dimensions of products (see, for example, Spiegler 2006).
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Introduction
The last decade has seen a flourishing theoretical literature in behavioral industrial organization (for a survey, see HUCK and ZHOU 2011, for a textbook treatment SPIEGLER 2011). While this literature has received widespread attention among policymakers, there is still only scant empirical evidence on the interaction between boundedly rational consumer behavior and competition. A notable exception is a recent experimental study by KALAYCI and POTTERS (2011) who examine duopolies where sellers can increase the complexity of their pricing strategies. In line with theoretical predictions, they find that sellers make use of complex pricing and successfully create confusion among consumers, thus, increasing their profits.
Our study adds to this evidence by documenting how consumers who face two dimensions of offers, a seller's reputation for quality and price, start to focus on one of these, price. This mirrors assumptions made in a number of theoretical behavioral IO papers, notably SPIEGLER (2006) . Consumers focus on price drives down prices to the Bertrand level but at the same time lowers quality when compared to exogenously fixed prices. As a consequence total welfare is reduced.
We implement our investigation in the context of a market for experience goods. Buyers of an experience good are uncertain about its quality before they buy, but learn (or experience) the good's quality after having bought and consumed it. Experience goods cover the broad middle ground between the extremes of goods involving no quality uncertainty at all (so-called inspection or search goods) and goods for which quality is not fully revealed even after the consumption (credence goods). Whenever contracts for the exchange of a good are incomplete and sellers have leeway to shade its quality about which the consumer finds out only if it is too late, the good in question is an experience good. Hence, many are.
A key role in markets for such goods is assumed by trust. Buyers may buy an experience good if they trust sellers to provide high quality, and will abstain if they do not. In other words, trust induces the demand for experience goods. In contrast, lack of trust impedes mutually advantageous transactions and results in low market efficiency.
We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods. To the best of our knowledge ours is the first study to investigate the role of price competition and reputations in markets for experience goods. We study two types of markets, monopolies and four-firm oligopolies. In both cases, buyers can observe previous 2 histories of sellers (their reputations) and the chosen or exogenously set price before they make their decisions.
With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive (monopolistic) markets. We then introduce a regulated intermediate price roughly halfway between the observed oligopoly and monopoly prices. The effect in monopolies is pretty much as standard intuition would predict. As price falls, volume increases and so does the quality of traded goods. Both effects imply a rise in efficiency of around 50%. Surprisingly, the same effects occur when we introduce the regulated intermediate price in oligopolies. In contrast to standard intuition, demand does not fall in reaction to the price increase and quality rises even further, rendering the regulated oligopoly the most efficient market by far.
This counterintuitive effect of price regulation can be explained as follows. Under unregulated Bertrand competition consumers start to ignore reputations and focus on price when choosing a seller. Consequently, prices fall to a very low level where buyers' damage from buying a "lemon" is getting small which adds to consumers' "careless" focus on price.
If, on the other hand, higher prices are exogenously imposed, buyers are forced to pay more attention to reputations -after all reputations are now the only attribute that differs between sellers -and buying from a low-quality firm does hurt them now much more substantially.
With regulated prices firms lose one of their two "marketing instruments". The only dimension they can now compete is quality. Thus, there are, both, demand-and supplyinduced forces that push up quality. In unregulated oligopolies almost 20% of all traded goods are lemons (despite an accurate eBay-style feedback mechanism that allows all buyers to track the entire history of all sellers). With price regulation the lemon share falls to just 6%. This increase in quality also more than offsets the increase in price such that also the trade volume is higher despite the higher price.
1
The causal chain in monopolies has only two simple steps. There, a lower regulated price increases demand as textbooks would have it. Given this increase in demand it now becomes more costly for monopolists to lose the trust buyers place in them and, consequently, they supply higher average quality.
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Our finding shows how standard textbook intuition about price and demand can go wrong in markets that suffer from informational deficiencies. In the markets we implement, these deficiencies induce moral hazard but a similar mechanism may operate in case of adverse selection. Regulation may directly aim at removing such deficiencies (for example by introducing standardization, certification, or watch dogs) but in many cases such direct regulation may be very costly. Price regulation is much cheaper to implement, administer and enforce than most other alternatives. Yet, as we see here, it can be very effective.
Our study experimentally investigates the relation of trust, competition, and the role of prices. While there is a sizeable literature on trust games investigating how different institutional features (such as feedback or enforcement mechanisms 2 ) impact on levels of trust, our previous paper (HUCK, LÜNSER, and TYRAN (2012) ) examines the impact of choice of trading partners on trust in a market for experience goods. The present paper can be seen as introducing the second element of competition into the trust game framework, that of price choice. A close match to our paper is DULLECK, KERSCHBAMER and SUTTER (2011) who have investigated endogenous pricing in markets for credence goods. In such markets consumers
cannot be sure what quality they got even after experiencing the product. The focus in DULLECK et al. is somewhat different from ours as they focus on the effectiveness of institutional remedies for market failures such as liability and verifiability.
There is a small experimental literature on price controls in other types of markets. ISAAC and PLOTT (1981) study double oral auctions and find that the standard partial equilibrium model predicts the effects of price controls remarkably well if the price control (ceiling or floor) is binding. For non-binding controls (which according to the model should be neutral) they do, however, find some unpredicted effects: price ceilings slightly above the competitive equilibrium price lower the actual market price, price floors slightly below the competitive equilibrium price increase the actual market price. Similar findings are reported by SMITH and WILLIAMS (1981) who also study the dynamic response to the removal of price controls, and for posted-offer markets by COURSEY and SMITH (1983) . DUFWENBERG, GNEEZY, GOEREE, and NAGEL (2007) report how the introduction of a binding price floor in a Bertrand duopoly, somewhat perversely, decreases actual prices. All of these studies examine, however, markets for inspection goods of known quality such that there are no informational asymmetries that would hinder market performance.
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The paper that is perhaps most closely related to ours is BROWN, FALK, and FEHR (2004) who study endogenous relational contracts in markets that rely on gift-exchange and, thus, suffer from moral hazard. 3 They observe the endogenous emergence of long-term relations with generous rent sharing and high effort. There are, however, a number of crucial difference between their study and ours. First, in their study prices are always endogenous which prevents them from identifying the separate effects of the two elements of competition, freedom of choice and endogenous prices. Second, there is no random matching benchmark as agents' matching is always endogenous. This would correspond to having only oligopoly treatments in our study. Third, agents from both market sides have to form pairs which removes an important aspect of competition in many markets, namely competition for market shares. Figure 1 shows the basic game used in all treatments of the experiment, a binary trust game 4 with a price p. This game is a stylized representation of a situation in which a buyer has to decide whether or not to buy an experience good of the quality which is chosen by the seller after the buyer's choice. In case the buyer decides not to buy the good (move "X" in Figure 1) we assume that he buys a simple item of known quality (an inspection good) that all sellers carry in their shops, just so that he does not leave empty-handed. This results in payoffs of 20
Experimental design, procedures and a little bit of theory
for the buyer and 15 for the seller. This simply captures the idea that for a seller it is always good to attract a buyer to his shop even if the buyer does not choose the more expensive experience good. As we will see this is particularly important in the competition case where a seller's worst nightmare is an empty store which gives a zero payoff. While the inspection good provides a low but certain payoff, the payoff from the experience good can be high but is uncertain because it depends on the seller's choice of quality. While we effectively assume that the price of the inspection good is fixed (say, due to perfect competition in that market) the price, p, of the experience good is, in principle, flexible but will be regulated in some treatments.
In Figure 1 , if the buyer decides to trust the seller (move "Y"), the seller can choose between low quality (move "left") and high quality (move "right"). Delivering low quality is 3 A similar study for search goods can be found in KIRCHSTEIGER, NIEDERLE, and POTTERS (2005) . 4 Adding the price choice to the binary trust game makes it akin to the "lost wallet game" Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) . However, the focus of this paper is on measuring beliefs in a non-competitive environment is thus rather different from ours. 5 more profitable for the seller (due to lower costs) but harms the buyer. The buyer in fact prefers not to buy the experience good at all over buying a low-quality good as long as the price is not below 40 (which we rule out in our experiment). To implement monopolistic markets we randomly assign buyers to sellers. Each buyer is assigned with probability ¼ to each seller which implies that sellers can have multiple (or no) buyers in any given period. In oligopolistic markets buyers choose sellers, knowing each seller's price. In markets with endogenous prices, prices are chosen by sellers at the very beginning of each period. In treatments with a regulated price this price-setting stage is simply omitted. We recruited 288 participants, mostly students from various fields, via the internet.
5
Upon arrival subjects were provided with written instructions and randomly assigned to cubicles in the laboratory. 6 Each subject only participated in one session and we made sure that no subject had participated in other related trust studies. The instructions employed neutral language, avoiding terms like "trust", "trustworthiness", "buyer", "seller" and "price".
Buyer and sellers were simply called "A"-participants and "B"-participants, respectively.
Decisions were labeled as in Figure 1 . In treatments with endogenous price choice "B"-participants decided upon a "number p" at the beginning of each round. Several control questions were included at the end of the instructions to ensure that the participants understood the game. The experiment started after all participants had answered all the control questions correctly and there were no further questions regarding the game. Subjects were randomly and anonymously matched to groups of eight and were randomly assigned one of two roles: four participants took the role of buyers and four participants the role of sellers.
Additionally, to identify participants over rounds, buyers and sellers were randomly assigned a number between one and four. The role and the number were communicated to subjects via the first computer screen. Matching groups of eight, roles, as well as assigned numbers stayed constant throughout the entire experiment.
For each treatment we have nine independent matching groups with eight subjects each.
Sessions lasted on average between 60 and 90 minutes including instruction time. Participants received a lump sum depending on their role in the experiment. 7 During the experiment payoffs were given in points which in the end were changed into Euro by a previously known exchange rate of 1 point per 0.015 Euro. All subjects were paid anonymously.
As mentioned before, in the FREE treatments sellers chose a price p at the beginning of each period. Prices were displayed to all buyers and sellers. 8 Following this, depending on the matching procedure, buyers were either randomly assigned to a seller or chose one. After that they chose between "X" or "Y". Then sellers learned how many buyers were matched with 5 We used GREINER's (2004) ORSEE. 6 A translation of the instructions is given in Appendix A. The original text was written in German and is available from the authors on request. The experimental software was programmed in FISCHBACHER's (2007) z-Tree and the experiment was run in the experimental laboratory at the University of Erfurt. 7 While buyers received 150 points, sellers received 330 points. A higher lump sum fee for sellers was paid in order to provide a suitable payoff for sellers who did not very often interact with buyers. 8 We kindly asked subjects to note the respective number p on a provided blank for all buyers in all rounds.
7 them as well as how many of those also decided to buy the experience good. Note that the outside option of 15 is paid to a seller if he is first matched with a buyer who then decides not to buy the experience good, while the seller's payoff is zero if no buyer is matched with him.
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Then finally, given a seller had at least one buyer of the experience good, the seller had to decide between "left" and "right" -and this decision determined the quality sold to all his buyers, i.e., sellers could not discriminate between different buyers (who they could not identify anyway).
At the end of each period, buyers who decided to buy the experience good were reminded of the respective price p and informed about the choice their seller had made as well as about the resulting payoff. Sellers were simply reminded of their price p and of the number of buyers who bought the experience good from them, their own choice and the resulting payoff. 10 The sequence of the game with price competition is displayed in Figure 2 ; without price competition, of course, the first stage is missing, i.e. sellers did not get to choose the price p at the beginning of the game. at least one buyer and chose low quality; finally, a hash turned green if a seller had at least 9 Remember that even if a buyer might not trust the seller with the experience good, the seller has also an inspection good to sell which the buyer buys. 10 Note that sellers who interacted with more than one buyer received a payoff from each interaction. For the one-shot game theoretical predictions do not depend on whether or not there is competition. With a fixed price all sellers will choose "left" if the subgame is actually
reached. This will be anticipated by buyers who will choose the outside option "X". With a flexible price a monopolist would, of course, try to extract as much rent as possible but he cannot raise the price above 40 without losing the custom of the buyer. The subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is, hence, that the seller will choose p = 40, the buyer will choose "Y,"
and the seller will, finally, pick low quality by playing "left." With Bertrand competition the price would be driven down to p = 5 but in order to ensure better comparability between the treatments we cut the possible price range at the monopoly level. This makes also sure that the nature of the subgame, after the price is determined, is identical in all games: With a price (weakly) above 40 the subgame remains a trust game where the buyer has to think about whether or not he really wants to purchase the good. With prices below 40 the nature of the subgame would crucially change since buyers would then prefer to buy the good regardless of its quality. The bottom line is that the theoretical predictions for the one-shot game are identical for both, monopoly and oligopoly. And this is true under both price setting mechanisms. The one-shot theory predicts that it only matters whether the price is exogenous or endogenous -whether there is competition via endogenous matching or not is irrelevant.
In finitely repeated games, the predictions remain the same. In case of exogenous prices all Nash equilibria predict no trade; in case of price competition all subgame perfect equilibria predict low-quality trade at a price of p = 40.
Of course, these predictions are extremely naïve in that they assume that all subjects are fully rational selfish money maximizers and have common knowledge of this fact. As such they just provide a simple benchmark helping to organize some basic facts. More realistic models would allow for incomplete information and reputation building or for the presence of some behavioral types. In such environments competition would, of course, make a difference as sellers would compete for custom not only via price but also via their reputations (in the REG treatments only via their reputations). From this perspective, one would expect competition to matter in the usual way: Since endogenous matching creates incentives for 9 having a good reputation sellers should provide more high quality. This effect should be unambiguous in treatments with fixed prices. Modeling the FREE treatments would be trickier. In essence, sellers with identical reputations would again drive down the price to the bottom. But sellers with better reputations might now not only attract more buyers but could also be able to charge higher prices. In symmetric equilibria this would only be relevant off the equilibrium path but would basically induce even stronger incentives for the provision of high quality. Notice first the highly significant and substantial effect of endogenous matching. Both oligopoly treatments vastly outperform the monopolies, roughly tripling efficiency rates. This boost is driven by, both, higher average quantity and quality. In addition, average prices are much lower with competition (47.06) than without (59.60).
Experimental Results
Aggregate data
Similarly clear effects are observed with respect to regulation. In both market forms price regulation improves market performance. In MON, price regulation boosts trust from 36% to 51%, quality from 60% to 73% and efficiency from 22% to 37%. In OLI, a similar picture arises. Trust increases from 85% to 90%, quality from 80% to 94%, and efficiency from 68% to 85%. As can be seen in the bottom part of the table, all these effects are statistically significant with the exception of the demand effect in the oligopoly treatments.
12 Note that, as long as the buyer trusts, the sum of payoffs is maximal. Only the distribution of payoffs depends on the sellers' quality choice. But, crucially, the outcome after (Y, left) is not individually rational as the buyer would prefer X. Hence, we shall in what follows refer to (Y, right), the outcome with successful trade, as "the efficient outcome" (short for "the individually rational efficient outcome"). 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Treatment effects are tested by one-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests.
These unambiguous results are surprising. In one case, we observe that a lower price improves market performance, in the other that a higher price also improves performance.
Taken together this suggests a non-monotonic relation between prices and efficiency in markets for experience goods. With very low prices markets suffer because neither are consumers particularly careful when selecting a good, nor are there good incentives for firms to provide high quality: both, because consumers are less discerning and because the profit margin of high-quality goods becomes too small. On the other hand, with very high prices demand drops to such low levels that the incentives for reputation building are severely reduced. Thus, market efficiency is maximal with a regulated intermediate price that is high enough to ensure that high-quality products are profitable but at the same time not too high in order to keep demand at levels where the incentives for high quality provision and reputation building are maintained.
How do all these effects translate into payoffs for buyers and sellers? Figure 3 shows buyers' and sellers' earnings averaged over all periods in the four treatments. In line with standard intuition, forcing up prices by regulation in a competitive market harms buyers (their 13 The reported quality corrects for the number of interactions a seller had in a period. Thus, if a seller had 4 ≤ n buyers his quality choice enters the average n-times. If one considers each seller's decision only once following average qualities are obtained: average incomes fall by 21%, from 1058 to 831), but benefits sellers (their average incomes increase by 50%, from 504 to 758). In contrast, forcing prices down by regulation benefits both buyers and sellers in non-competitive markets (MON). Buyer incomes increase by 6%, and, surprisingly, seller incomes also increase by 9%.
14 Figure 7 also shows that, quite remarkably, the regulated oligopoly is the most profitable market institution for sellers, while it is, of course less surprising that Bertrand competition is best for buyers. While prices start out at the same level in MON-FREE as in OLI-FREE, they remain at high levels. The average price in MON-FREE is 59.60 and in OLI-FREE it is 47.06 over all 14 The increase for buyers and sellers is, however, not significant in a monopolistic market (Mann-Whitney Utests: for buyers 0.340 and for sellers 0.113, two-tailed). The change in buyer and seller payoffs in an oligopolistic market, on the other hand, is (Mann-Whitney U-tests: for buyers 0.001 and sellers 0.002, twotailed). at similar levels of around 50% in all treatments. While, as with prices, there are no initial differences between the treatments already after 5 periods, demand is clearly higher in the treatments where sellers compete for the business of buyers (i.e. in OLI) than in those without competition, and the difference becomes more pronounced over time. In the two treatments with oligopolistic competition, trust rates approach 100% in the last third of the experiment while they hover around 30-40% in treatments without competition. Clearly, competition via reputation induces trust in the sellers. with regulation exhibit far higher initial quality than the unregulated treatments (despite similar initial prices). How can this difference be explained? We conjecture that having just one "marketing instrument", namely quality, makes firms much more aware of its importance.
Perhaps sellers in the unregulated treatments believe that they can always compensate for a damaged reputation by lowering prices later on (which is, of course, true as in particular the unregulated oligopoly treatment shows where prices fall to very low levels). Average quality increases in all markets over time and is higher in the second half of the experiment (up to period 28) than in the first half. 15 Apparently, it takes some time for sellers to understand the value of a good reputation. 16 Yet, treatment effects on the levels of quality are substantial even if we average over all 30 periods (see Table 2 ). The most stable treatment is OLI-REG.
Remarkably the nine regulated oligopolies have average qualities of exactly 100% over almost all periods in the second half of the experiment.
End-game effects are pronounced in all treatments which is in line with previous findings in finitely repeated games. The significance of these end-game effects is twofold. First, we see 
Understanding the benefits of price regulation
The most striking finding in our experiment is the detrimental effect of price competition.
Price competition is fierce in OLI-FREE and quality is significantly lower in OLI-FREE than in OLI-REG. We have discussed the consequences of this price differential before. With very low prices consumers are less sensitive to reputations and for firms the profit margin of high-17 BOHNET, FREY, and HUCK (2001) report data from a finite-horizon trust experiment where trustworthiness reaches its maximum in the very last period. A conjecture is that this is driven by the public aggregate feedback they provide. Fierce price competition in OLI-FREE is not only explained by the sale of relatively unprofitable experience goods (recall from Figure 1 that at the convergence price of 45, selling a high-quality experience goods only yields a profit of 15). Posting low prices was attractive for sellers in OLI-FREE because it also helped to attract non-trusting buyers who instead of choosing a good of unknown quality preferred to buy the low-value inspection good. The profit from these buyers is also 15 (see Figure 1) . Hence, at prices of 45 which are typical in much of OLI-FREE, a seller is indifferent between selling a high-quality experience good or an inspection good. In fact, we find that even buyers who decide not to buy the experience good typically buy the inspection good from the seller who posts the lowest price.
It appears, thus, that buyers like the idea of fierce price competition as such. Perhaps they want to reward low-price sellers hoping that one day these sellers will also offer high quality.
Alas, this hope is in vain. Of course, all this happens in an environment where average quality is with 80% pretty high. Yet, for the 20% disappointments buyers have to endure, they have nobody to blame but their own obsession with price.
Conclusion
Competition has generally two elements: choice of trading partners and choice of price. In this paper we show that while the former is unambiguously good, the latter can be problematic in markets that suffer from informational deficiencies. In particular, we show that in markets with experience goods (suffering from moral hazard) regulated fixed prices can outperform endogenous prices in both, monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. This is surprising but has, as we argued above, an intuitive reason that has been advocated in the theoretical behavioral IO literature. Once there are multiple attributes of a product consumers might simply base their decisions on one of them (as, for example, in SPIEGLER 2006). In our case, buyers start to focus on price rendering price competition becomes so fierce that sellers' incentives to build up pristine reputations are diminished, simply because profits from high-quality goods become too small. In other words, if consumers do not reward high quality with a willingness to pay higher prices, they should not be surprised if quality is less than perfect.
Anecdotally, our finding seems to resemble a string of recent scandals in the German meat market that was plagued by huge amounts of extremely low-quality meat (well past its sell-by date, in fact, in some cases biologically hazardous). An interesting discussion ensued with two main lines of arguments: calls for more regulation were as abundant as fierce criticism of German consumers' obsession with everything that is cheap. (In particular, when it comes to non-durables Germans tend to have a low willingness to pay. For food, for example, they spend, in relative terms, only around three quarters of what Italian consumers spend, see SEALE, REGMI, and BERNSTEIN (2003) .) In the context of our stylized study both arguments appear to be valid. Clearly, we find that it is consumers' choice behavior that diminishes sellers' incentives to provide high quality. Yet, regulation can also overcome the problem.
But the intriguing aspect of our findings is that regulation needs not target quality. Of course, quality regulation constitutes one way to improve market outcomes but it is notoriously complicated and costly. Again, this is anecdotally reflected in the example of the German meat market where quality controls differ hugely between different states and there is no sign of reaching a consensus on how monitoring should be improved. Our study suggests that there might be an inexpensive yet very efficient short-cut: price regulation. With higher enforced prices consumers become more careful in choosing sellers. They pay more attention to reputations and, consequently, sellers face much steeper incentives to provide high quality.
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Closer to orthodox beliefs are our findings on the first aspect of competition, endogenous choice of trading partners. In our earlier paper (HUCK, LÜNSER, and TYRAN (2012)) we have shown that such choice on its own can improve market outcomes enormously. In that study we show that these improvements occur under different feedback institutions. In particular, the study shows that for choice to work it is not necessary that consumers have access to full feedback, i.e., to the entire history of all sellers. Rather, it is sufficient that buyers simply remember their own experience with sellers. That is, as long as sellers are not perfectly anonymous and are identified via labels, endogenous choice of trading partners is shown to have substantial positive effects. From the perspective of this earlier paper, the current one establishes that the same beneficial effects of choice hold in the presence of the second element of competition: endogenously chosen prices.
to go "left" of "right". If he decides to pick "left", the A-participant will earn 60 -p points and the B-participant will earn p -5 points from this interaction. If he decides to pick "right", the A-participant will earn 85 -p points and the B-participant will earn p -30 points.
If a B-participant is not chosen by at least one A-participant or if all A-participants who have chosen him picked X, he does not have to make a decision. Otherwise the B-participant additionally learns the number of A-participants who have chosen him and picked Y and has to make the same decision for all these A-participants, that is whether he wants to go "left" or "right" for all A-participants. A B-participant who has not been chosen by at least one Aparticipant earns 0 points.
Payoffs for an A-participant and a B-participant from one interaction.
(B-participants can receive payoffs from several interactions in one round.)
The experiment consists of 30 rounds. After each round you will be informed about what has happened and you will be reminded of your payoff and your total sum of points so far.
Moreover, all (A-and B-) participants can keep track of the entire history of Bparticipants. For all participants there will be a screen depicting the history of all Bparticipants. For each round and each B-participant there will be a colored little # (hash) with a number behind.
• A black # indicates that the B-participant had nothing to decide because either no A-participant chose him or all A-participants who chose him picked X.
• A red # indicates that the B-participant picked "left".
• A green # indicates that the B-participant picked "right".
• The integer behind the # shows the number of A-participants who picked Y after choosing this B-participant.
Please note on the additionally distributed blank the respective number p of each B-participant which is displayed to you above the relevant column on the screen.
These are the rules. Your can trust us that everything will happen exactly according to these rules. Take your time going over these instructions again and feel free to ask questions. But don't shout! Simply raise your hand. 
